Combinatorial auctions are used in a variety of application domains such as transportation or industrial procurement using a variety of bidding languages and different allocation constraints. This flexibility in the bidding languages and the allocation constraints is essential in these domains, but has not been considered in the theoretical literature so far. In this paper, we analyze different pricing rules for ascending combinatorial auctions which allow for such flexibility: winning levels, and deadness levels. We determine the computational complexity of these pricing rules and show that deadness levels actually satisfy an ex-post equilibrium, while winning levels do not allow for a strong game-theoretical solution concept. We investigate the relationship of deadness levels and the simple price update rules used in efficient ascending combinatorial auction formats.
Introduction
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) allow selling or buying a set of heterogeneous items to or from multiple bidders. Bidders can specify package bids, i.e., a bid price is defined for a subset of the items for auction (Cramton et al. 2006 ). The price is only valid for the entire package and the package is indivisible. For example, in a CA a bidder might want to buy items x, y, and z for a package price of $100, which might be more than the total of the prices for the items sold individually. CAs can be seen as generic mechanisms for multi-object markets as they allow expressing complex preferences such as items being substitutes or complements for bidders. They have found application in a variety of domains such as the auctioning of spectrum licenses (Cramton Information Systems Research 00(0) , pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS 2009), truck load transportation (Caplice 2007) , bus routes (Cantillon and Pesendorfer 2006) , or industrial procurement (Bichler et al. 2006 ).
The design of efficient CAs has drawn considerable attention, as they raise fundamental questions on pricing and efficiency in multi-object markets. If bidders revealed their preferences truthfully, the auctioneer only had to solve an optimization problem to find the efficient allocation. Typically bidders have incentives to speculate and deviate from truthful bidding. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism has therefore been a significant contribution in auction theory. Green and Laffont (1977) proved that the sealed-bid VCG mechanism is the unique auction mechanism in which truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. In spite of this powerful result, this mechanism has a number of practical problems when used in multi-object markets Milgrom 2006b, Rothkopf 2007) . Also, many auctioneers want to have a transparent open-cry bidding process rather than a sealed-bid format. For example, almost all spectrum auctions organized throughout the world are iterative auctions with multiple rounds.
It is interesting to understand, whether there are also iterative CA formats, which also satisfy strong game-theoretical solution concepts, which limit incentives for speculation. Preference elicitation in iterative auctions can invalidate dominant strategy equilibria existing in a single-step version of a mechanism (Conitzer and Sandholm 2002) , but ex post equilibria can be achieved which also do not require agents to speculate about other bidders' valuations (Shoham and LeytonBrown 2009) . Much progress has been made on this question in the theoretical literature in the recent years. iBundle (Parkes and Ungar 2000) , the Ascending Proxy Auction (APA) (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) , and dVSV (de Vries et al. 2007) lead to an efficient allocation, if bidders bid straightforward 1 , which is an ex post equilibrium as long as the buyer submodularity condition holds for all valuations. Buyer submodularity is a restriction on the valuations of bidders, which defines that bidders are more valuable when added to a smaller coalition. It is interesting that such a strong solution concept is possible in iterative CAs, even though the result does not hold for general valuations. This line of work is heavily based on duality theory in linear programming.
All these auction formats use non-linear and personalized ask prices and increase these ask price for losing bids by a minimum increment, which causes a large number of auction rounds (Schneider et al. 2010) . 2 The APA uses proxy bidders in order to cope with the large number of auction rounds, and to make sure that bidders follow the straightforward strategy, which turns the 1 Bidders follow the straightforward strategy if they bid only on the surplus maximizing package(s) in every round 2 We will refer to ask prices as the prices set by the auctioneer during the auction, and bid prices as the prices specified by bidders, if it is necessary to distinguish prices. In this paper, we assume that bidders always bid on the ask price.
mechanism into a sealed bid auction. Apart from these theoretical advances, a number of linear or item-price auction formats have been developed. These include versions of the combinatorial clock auction (Porter et al. 2003 , where item-level ask prices rise, whenever there is overdemand on an item, but also the family of auction formats with pseudo-dual linear ask prices (Kwasnica et al. 2005 , Bichler et al. 2009 ).
As of yet, there is little theory on equilibrium bidding strategies in such auctions, although lab experiments yielded high levels of allocative efficiency. Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) introduce different pricing rules for CAs. Pricing rules refer to functions by which the auctioneer determines ask prices based on bids submitted in the auction.
Winning levels (W Ls) describe the lowest possible bid which would win if no other bids are submitted, whereas deadness levels (DLs) are a lower bound to bids, which still can become winning in the course of the auction. DLs and W Ls describe natural bounds and interesting feedback for a losing bidder. While there is no rationale to bid below the DL, bidding at the W L could be rational in some situations, where a bidder is the only one able to outbid a winning coalition of bidders.
W Ls are equivalent to the minimal winning bids described by Rothkopf et al. (1998) . These pricing rules are independent of the allocation rules, and laboratory experiments with respective auction formats yielded high levels of efficiency (Adomavicius et al. 2012) . They are very generic and can be considered a fundamental contribution in the emerging Information Systems literature on decision support in smart markets (Xia et al. 2004 , Bapna et al. 2007 , Guo et al. 2007 , Bichler et al. 2009 , Scheffel et al. 2011 and in the general literature on CAs.
The analysis in Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) is focused on a pure OR bidding language and assumes no substitutes valuations. OR bids can represent only bids that do not have any substitutabilities, i.e., purely additive and superadditive valuations (Nisan 2006) . Also, this initial work did not analyze equilibrium strategies in such auctions. However, DLs and W Ls introduce a very generic concept, which can be applied to any bidding language. It is natural to ask, how these generic pricing rules can be defined for auctions with XOR bidding languages and other types of allocation constraints as well, and which game-theoretical solution concepts can be satisfied.
Auctions with strong game-theoretical solution concepts are strategically easier for bidders because there is no need to speculate about other bidders' valuations. This makes bidding strategically easy and respective auction formats are more likely to lead to high efficiency.
In this paper, we introduce W Ls and DLs for general CAs, which allow for XOR bids and other constraints. Auctioneers use various types of allocation constraints to limit the number of winners or the number of items allocated to one bidder or to a group of bidders. Such constraints are actually the rule rather than the exception in application domains such as industrial procurement (Bichler by the auctioneer and the bidders, which allows for considerably more flexibility in the specification of the preferences of market participants.
While generic pricing rules for different CAs with allocation constraints would also have significant practical importance, we show that these pricing rules bare significant theoretical challenges.
The main goal of this paper is not to introduce a new auction format, but to define and analyze computational and game-theoretical properties of W Ls and DLs for FCAs. In particular, we want to understand which pricing rules allow for ex post equilibria and how these pricing rules relate to the theoretical framework on efficient and ascending CAs Ungar 2000, de Vries et al. 2007 ). This connects also recent IS contributions to the game-theoretical literature in this field.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we briefly discuss allocation constraints in CAs.
We define winning and deadness levels and describe respective algorithms in Section 3. In Section 4 we determine the computational complexity for these pricing rules. In Section 5 we analyze the impact of allocation constraints on efficient CAs and perform an equilibrium analysis of ascending CAs using either winning or deadness levels as ask prices in Section 6. In Section 7 we report on our computational experiments, before we provide conclusions in Section 8.
Allocation Constraints in Combinatorial Auctions
Allocation constraints specify limits on the allocation of the available items to the bidders without explicitly limiting bid prices or revenue of a bidder or a group of bidders. On the other hand price constraints set price limits on items, packages, a bidder's budget or auctioneer revenue. It has been shown that incentive-compatible auctions are impossible in general if there are private budget limits (Dobzinski et al. 2008) , and also reserve prices by the auctioneer increase expected revenue at the expense of efficiency (Myerson 1981) . Table 1 provides an overview of allocaton and price constraints in CAs, subsumed by the term side constraints. We focus on efficient auctions, and therefore will limit ourselves to allocation constraints. One can also divide side constraints into bidder specific ones (bidder level) and such constraints, which concern more than a single bidder (group level). The latter are typically specified by the auctioneer, while bidder specific constraints could be imposed by the bidder or the auctioneer, especially when the OR bidding language is used.
Allocation constraints are important in many domains. Spectrum auctions, which have been the driving application for much research in this area, regularly face spectrum caps (max # items/bidder) (Seifert and Ehrhart 2005) . In industrial procurement or the auction for transportation services allocation constraints are the rule rather than the exception (Caplice 2007 , Bichler et al. 2006 , Sandholm 2003 , Sandholm and Suri 2006 . Buyers need to specify lower or upper bounds on the number of suppliers overall or per group (min/max # winning bidders): lower bounds in order to hedge the risk that some suppliers fail to deliver and upper bounds in order to avoid administrative expenses. Market share constraints are defined on a group of bidders. For example, due to corporate requirements at least one minority supplier must be included in the set of winners on a particular set of items. Auctioneers also need to impose lower or upper bounds on the number of items (min/max # items/bidder), which can be awarded to a particular bidder or a group of bidders. Exclusive disjunction describes constraints such that a bidder is allowed to win one set of items or another one, but not both. For example, an auctioneer allows a bidder to win one of two different regions A and B, but not both. Such constraints can also be specified on a group of bidders. The XOR language can be seen as a separate bidder specific allocation constraint.
While the XOR language already captures many further allocation constraints, experimental analysis has been shown that OR bidding languages are often more efficient than XOR languages due to the reduced number of package bids that need to be submitted (Brunner et al. 2010) .
OR bids can represent only bids that do not have any substitutabilities, i.e., purely additive and superadditive valuations (Nisan 2006) . If a bidder uses an OR bidding language, it might also be useful to specify constraints on the number of items (min/max # items/bidder) or budget awarded, in order to avoid the exposure problem, which can occur with substitutes valuations (e.g., a bidder is winning packages AB and CD, but only wants two lots at a maximum) or to express his capacity constraints in case he is a supplier in a procurement auction. Constraints of exclusive disjunction are relevant to the auctioneer in case of an OR bidding language, when a bidder is allowed to win one set of items or another one, but not both. Carriers in a transportation auction use such disjunctive constraints to communicate the message "give me this set of lanes, or this set of lanes, but not both" (Caplice 2007) .
Having flexibility in the bidding language and the allocation constraints used by the auctioneer and the bidders allows for a much broader applicability of CAs, and this can be considered a prerequisite for most applications in transportation and industrial procurement. Table 1 Side constraints
Pricing Rules
Before we provide a formal definition, we will first provide an example to informally introduce the pricing rules DL and W L. We will contrast these with pricing rules as they are used in iBundle or in auction formats with pseudo-dual linear ask prices, such as RAD (Kwasnica et al. 2005 The calculation of RAD prices requires solving a number of linear programs. Note that these linear prices can be lower than a losing bid (see the bid on AC of bidder B4). Another problem with pseudo-dual ask prices is the fact that they can also decrease if the competition shifts, and that the calculation does not take into account allocation constraints explicitly. This makes it difficult to define an equilibrium analysis and as of now there is little theory. Bichler et al. (2009) analyze the problems in defining pseudo-dual linear ask prices.
For the rest of the paper, we will focus on the family of efficient and ascending auctions (iBundle, APA, and dVSV). Apart from the use of proxy agents, APA and iBundle are equivalent and follow a subgradient algorithm, whereas dVSV uses a primal-dual approach (de Vries et al. 2007 ). Line 4 in our example shows a new set of ask prices in iBundle. The auction format increases the bids of all losing bidders by a minimum bid increment ($1 in this example) (Parkes and Ungar 2000) . DLs and W Ls describe generic pricing rules, i.e., they are independent of the allocation constraints used by the auctioneer. DLs describe deadness level ask prices, which are simply the bids of all bidders in the last round in this example without any constraints. In this case, DLs do not need to be personalized. Losing bidders need to bid higher than this by a minimum bid increment. With a minimum bid increment of one, the DL would be at the iBundle ask price for the losing bidders B3, B4, and B5. In the presence of allocation constraints, DL ask prices can be much higher than the ones of iBundle, as we will see later.
The W L describes the lowest bid prices, at which a single bid would become winning without a new complementary bid of another bidder. Bidders B4 and B5 could become winning at a lower price, if they would form a coalition. A known problem with package bidding is the threshold problem, in which bidders seeking larger packages may be favoured, because small bidders do not have the incentive or capability to top the tentative winning bids of the large bidder. In such a problem, the W L for a small bidder might be way too high to outbid a winning bidder unilaterally, and with only W L ask prices, it will become difficult for bidders to coordinate. The spread between
DLs and W Ls can often be quite large in realistic value models.
Of course, one can also think of personalized and non-linear ask prices inbetween DLs and W Ls.
The coalition of B4 and B5 in our example would need to increase their bids by a combined $3 plus increment in order to become winning. Both bidders would become winning, if bidder B4 bid $21.5
and bidder B5 bid $8.5, for example We refer to such prices as coalitional winning levels (CW L).
A CW L could provide an alternative to linear-price auction formats, and help mitigate threshold problems and coordinate bidders. However, computing CW Ls turns out to be challenging. First, the number of losing coalitions can grow very fast with the number of items and bids in the auction.
Second, and more importantly, there are a many ways how the costs to outbid the winning coalition can be shared among the bidders in a losing coalition. One can think about cost sharing which is proportional to the bids in the previous round or a cost sharing that satisfies certain fairness criteria. Independent of how CW Ls are set, there will be incentives to free-ride on other bidders in a losing coalition. Due to the ambiguities in the definition of CW Ls, we will focus on DLs and W Ls in this paper, which describe natural upper and lower bounds for bids in an ascending auction, and leave the analysis of CW Ls for future research.
Winning Levels
We first introduce the necessary terminology. Let K denote the set of items and I the set of bidders.
A subauction on itemset S ⊆ K refers to an auction where only items l ∈ S are auctioned. Auction state k ∈ N refers to the auction after the first k bids are submitted. A bid is a tuple b = (S, v, k, i) where S denotes the package the bid refers to, v the amount bid, k the auction state after the bid 
The combinatorial allocation problem (CAP ), also known as winner determination problem (WDP),
denotes the maximum value of this optimization problem (henceforth we will refer to it simply as value) and W IN k (K) ∈ C k the value-maximizing allocation at state k. 5 CAP (S) is the value of subauction S.
The winning level of a package S for bidder i at auction state k, W L k (S, i), is the minimal price i must bid to win S at auction state k + 1.
Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) define the anonymous W L of package S at auction state k by
Intuitively a bid on S can only win, if the bid price together with the value of the complementary set of items K\S exceeds the actual value of the whole auction. Implicitly, the following assumptions are made: (i) OR bidding language and (ii) absence of allocation constraints. When these assumptions are relaxed, the calculation of W Ls as in equation (1) is inappropriate. A first reason is that allocation constraints, which are not bidder specific, cannot be globally validated when solving subauction CAP (K\S). In addition, W Ls must be personalized as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1. Consider an auction with items A, B, C, bidders B1, B2 and B3 and the constraint that each bidder cannot win more than two items. Bidder B1 bids at k = 1 $5 on AB, B2 at k = 2 $1 on AB and at k = 3 $2 on C and B3 bids at k = 4 $3 on AB . W L(C) is for B1 $4 whereas for B2 it is only $2.
3 For example, a bid with state k = 3 is the third bid submitted in chronological order.
4 To the best our knowledge no allocation constraint has been proposed which does not fulfill this property.
5 Depending on the context we may omit index k.
We introduce the following formula to calculate personalized W Ls that takes XOR bidding and allocation constraints into account:
The proof is relegated to Appendix A. CAP k (K, S i ) denotes the value of the whole auction provided that bidder i wins package S for free. Thus the auction value CAP k (K, S i ) is raised from the items in K\S, as it is the case in CAP (K\S). If the OR bidding language is used and no allocation constraints exist, the computation in (2) yields the same W Ls as (1).
Deadness Levels
The deadness level of package S at auction state k, DL k (S, i), is the minimal price a bidder must bid to have a chance to win S in any future auction state.
DLs constitute lower bounds on bid prices and all future bids below are "dead", i.e., they cannot win any more no matter which bids are submitted in future auction states k > k. This implies that
is monotonically increasing through the progress of any iterative auction.
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Proposition 2.
The proofs are based on the definitions of the metrics and are given in Appendix A. Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) define the anonymous DL of a package S by
In words, a bid on S cannot be part of the winning allocation if it is below the value of subauction S (i.e. CAP (S)). For example if S = AB and there are already bids A = $10 and B = $15, then any bid on AB below $25 is dead.
The DL in equation (3) is not valid if there are allocation constraints or any of the bidders uses an XOR bidding language. In these cases DLs must be personalized. We also need to understand what influence the additional allocation constraints might have in future auction states. For instance, consider again Example 1. B3 loses AB at current state k = 4. But if in the future state k = 5 B1
Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS bids $8 on C, then his previous winning bid on AB loses due to the allocation constraint 8 . Thus
B3 can win AB for $3 and his personal DL at k = 4 is $3. We say that the bid of B1 on AB has been "blocked" at k = 5 due to the constraint.
A bid on package S loses in an auction with allocation constraints if at least one of the following conditions is met: (i) There exists a higher bid or bid combination in subauction S that wins in the whole auction (without violating allocation constraints). ( and does not win due to allocation constraints.
Computing DL k (S, i) requires knowing which currently winning bids in S can be blocked in future auction states. We call these bids blockable.
Removing a blockable foreign to i bid in S causes another lower foreign bid (or bids) in S to win.
If a distinct future statek can be reached where both the second and the first bid are blocked, then the DL k (S, i) becomes even lower, since i does not have to overbid any of them. We will say that the two bids are simultaneously blockable at current state k and simultaneously blocked atk > k.
To see this happen, consider again Example 1 with an additional item D and seek for DL(AB, B2).
We have already argued that the highest bid on AB by B1 is blockable. Removing it causes the bid of B3 to win. This second bid is also blockable due to a similar reason as the first blockable bid (B3 may bid high on D). More importantly, these two bids are simultaneously blockable since there is a future state with both bids blocked (see Table 3 Table 3 Bids in bold block crossed out bids and DL(AB, B2) = 1, k is denoted as superskript
We just highlighted the central role of simultaneously blockable bid sets in computing DL k (S, i).
These are bids by rivals of i, thus foreign to him, submitted in S. We denote a simultaneously blockable bid set in subauction S, at state k, comprising bids foreign to bidder i, as B block S,k,−i . Undoubtedly, foreign bids on packages which overlap with S but are not entirely in S are also preventing i to win S but these bids are not relevant at the most favorable future state for i that DL(S, i) represents.
The reason is that in this most favorable state the value of subauction K\S is high enough such that S is part of the winning allocation. Before providing the formal definition for B block S,k,−i , it is meaningful to sketch the algorithm which utilizes these sets to compute DL(S, i).
The algorithm identifies all simultaneously blockable bid sets. In our running example there was only one set when item D was present, comprising the bids of B1 and B3 on AB and two singleitem sets when D was not present, which were the two bids separately. The algorithm removes each identified set in turn and computes the value of CAP (S). The lowest value is DL(S, i), because DL(S, i) represents the most favorable future state for i to win S.
Having outlined the algorithm, we can state the conditions a set must fulfill in order to be declared as simultaneously blockable at current state k, withk being the future state where the set will be actually blocked. We begin with the indispensable conditions and continue with conditions which only accelerate the sketched algorithm. Their enumeration and motivation precedes the formal descrpition given in 5. We have already discussed that going from k tok in order to block bids in S, we add only bids in K\S since if they would overlap with S, they would prevent i from winning S. Their set is B = B K,k \B K,k , i.e. all bids between k andk. Bids in B must be winning else they cannot block any bids, or generally impact the allocation or prices. The first condition states that after the submission of B it must be feasible that i wins S (condition i). Secondly, inherent to the definition of a blocked bid is the condition that every bid in B block S,k,−i must be losing atk (condition ii).
Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Moving to conditions which only accelerate the sketched algorithm, we observe that if all bids in the simultaneosuly blockable set are losing at k, their removal will not lower the price i has to pay for S, hence at least one of them must be winning at k (condition iii). In Table 3 removing only bid 4 has no impact. Furthermore, it is not meaningful that a blockable bid set contains a bid that never wins, even after the removal of the rest bids of the set. As we begin to block some bids, previously losing bids turn to winning and these are the ones that lower the price of S if blocked.
. Furthermore, we observe that it is redundant to block a foreign bid on T ⊆ S if it is lower than a bid already submitted by i on T ⊆ T , since i can never pay less than his own bid. The set of all these bids, which we call non-i-dominated, is denoted by B are non-i-dominated (condition v). The concluding condition specifies that simultaneously blockable bid sets must be maximal (condition vi) since blocking and removing an extra bid can only lower the value of CAP (S). A set is defined as maximal if it satisfies a property (in our case the property is the satisfaction of conditions i to v) and there exist no strict superset of it that also satisfies the property. Hence adding an item in a maximal set causes violation of the property. In Table 3 bid 1 is not identified as simultanoeously blockable only because it is not maximal.
With this definition we can introduce the general method to compute DL k (S, i) for arbitrary allocation constraints.
General Method to Compute DL k (S, i)
In the first phase, the method takes as input all bids which are candidates to form simultaneously blockable bid sets. These are the bids in B ndom S,k,−i . The output of the first phase is the set of all simultaneously blockable bid sets in S. We can represent the first phase as a function f with argument B ndom S,k,−i and value the output of this phase, i.e. f : B ndom S,k,−i → {B block S,k,−i }. We consider here f as a black box since for the general description of the method only f 's argument and value matters.
In the second phase each of the identified sets B block S,k,−i ∈ f (B ndom S,k,−i ) is removed consecutively and the value of subauction S, denoted as CAP k (S, B S,k \B block S,k,−i ) is computed. The lowest of these values equals to DL(S, i). It is not always necessary to compute all these values. If we encounter a value not greater than the value of the bids of i in S, we do not need to continue since i must overbid the own bids. Equation 4 summarizes the general two-phase method.
The proof draws on the definition of DL k (S, i) and of simultaneously blockable bid sets.
Let c be the right side of equation 4 and B block * the argument of the minimum. First we show that
We define k * as the state at which: a) the bids in
are actually blocked and do not win due to condition i, b) a bid set B in K\S is submitted 
) is part of the winning allocation (due to condition i and that the winning allocation maximizes CAP over all feasible allocations). Similarly it can be argued that showed that c = argmin
. This is the definition of DL k (S, i).
Q.E.D.
With an OR bidding language and without allocation constraints (4) reduces to (3), since without these constraints, there are no blockable bids and thus Function f is specific to allocation constraints and the bidding language, which determine whether a bid set is simultaneously blockable or not. In Appendix B we provide an algorithm to calculate DLs for the XOR bidding language without additional allocation constraints. The XOR bidding language is fully expressive (Nisan and Segal 2006) , and it is used in high-stakes applications such as in spectrum auctions across Europe nowadays.
Computational Complexity
Computational complexity has turned out to be a practically relevant topic for the winner determination problem in CAs. We show that computational complexity is also a problem when computing pricing rules and that the computation of DLs is even one of the rare examples of a Π P 2 -complete problem.
The CAP is a well-known NP-complete problem in its decision version. The NP-completeness is proven for a variety of cases and bidding languages. Lehmann et al. (2006) prove the NPcompleteness of CAP for the OR and XOR bidding language by reducing from the independent set problem (Garey and Johnson 1972) using intersection graphs. Sandholm and Suri (2001) prove the completeness for numerous cases dealing with side constraints such as bounds on the maximal number of winners. It is easy to see that the computation of W Ls must be at least as hard as
Proof: Every instance of CAP can be viewed as an instance of W L for S = K. For S = K,
Thus W L contains CAP as a special case which is N P -complete. Q.E.D.
Interestingly, the DL problem (equation (4) CAP s need to be solved (Engel 1997) , which is still super exponential to the number of items in S. The actual number of blockable bid sets depends strongly on the allocation constraints.
Obviously the problem belongs to a higher complexity class than N P . This class is Π i.e. an oracle which is able to decide the decision version of the winner determination problem in a single operation. Every CA employs a method to solve CAP . If we assume the presence of such an efficient method, completeness in these classes plays exactly the role of N P -completeness for "ordinary" optimization problems -it distinguishes the intractable from the efficiently solvable (Umans 2000) . Π P 2 = coN P N P and Σ
We first show DL(S, i) ∈ Π P 2 with the decision problem DL(S, i) > c.
Proof: We show that there exists a polynomially balanced, polynomial-time decidable 3-ary relation R such that DL = {x : ∀y 1 ∃y 2 such that (x, y 1 , y 2 ∈ R)}. x represents the graph containing all bids in S. Each node in x represents a $1 bid and nodes are connected if and only if the bids they represent are compatible (e.g. do not overlap). y 1 represents a subgraph of x which is induced according to function f (i.e. each subgraph represents a bid set after removing a simultaneously blockable bid set). y 2 is an independent set of y 1 . Note that its cardinality equals the value of the auction. Relation R decides in polynomial time that y 1 is a subgraph of x, y 2 an independent set of y 1 and that y 2 contains more than c nodes. Thus R is polynomially decidable. Furthermore R is polynomially balanced (since the lengths of y 1 and y 2 are bounded by a polynomial in the length of x). Q.E.D.
9 The exponent N P denotes that the non-deterministic Turing machine accepting Σ P 2 and the complement of Π P 2 uses a N P oracle. We refer to Papadimitriou (1993) for formal definitions.
Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Intuitively the DL is greater than c if all bid combinations prescribed by f result in a subauction value greater than c. In graph terms, all of the induced subgraphs must have an independent set of cardinality greater than c. Remember that DL is a minimization problem and if it exists one subgraph with value not greater than c then the answer to the question becomes negative. That explains the necessity of the first quantifier ∀ and is central for the complexity of the problem, which is a min-max optimization problem (Ko and Lin 1995) .
We now prove the completeness of DL(S, i) in Π P 2 . We make use of the structures of a fairly restrictive case of the problem, as it is common ground in such proofs (Lehmann et al. 2006) , to reduce from the minmax-Clique problem defined in Ko and Lin (1995) .
Definition 6. minmax-Clique: Given is a graph G = (V, E) with its vertices V partitioned into subsets V i,j , 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ J. For any function t : {1, ..., I} → {1, ..., J}, G t denotes the induced subgraph of G on the vertex set
Intuitively the graph represents a network with I components, with each component V i having J subcomponents V i,1 , ..., V i,J . At any time t only one subcomponent V i,t(i) of each V i is active and the problem is to find the maximum clique size of all possible active subgraphs G t . The minmax-Clique problem is Π Proof: We reduce from minmax-Clique. For each subcomponent V i,j we create a bidder who participates in subauction S. Since J = 2, each component corresponds to a pair of bidders. We introduce the allocation constraint that no two bidders belonging to the same pair are allowed to win together in K\S. For each node we create a $1 bid on T with T ⊆ S submitted from the bidder associated to the subcomponent the node belongs to. Whenever two nodes in G are connected, their associated bids are compatible.
10 It can be observed now that f Clique (G) = DL(S, i).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the 2 |I| possible active subgraphs G t and the bidder (bid) sets that remain after removing each of the 2 |I| simultaneously blockable bidder (bid) sets of cardinality |I|, due to the constraint in K\S. Furthermore, the max-Clique problem on the complementary intersection graphs is equivalent to the maximum independent set problem on the actual intersection graph and thus equivalent to CAP . Q.E.D.
An interpretation of the constraint we introduced to prove completeness is that the auctioneer is not willing to deal with more than a single winner from a region, assuming that bidders are paired according to their region. We conjecture that the DL problem without such constraints cannot be easier since the number of the simultaneously blockable bidders and thus the number of CAP s which must be solved becomes much greater. To see this, consider an example with 8 foreign bidders in S and |K\S| = 4. Without the constraint the bidder sets amount to 8 4 whereas with the constraint only 2 4 bidder sets need to be evaluated.
Allocation Constraints and their Impact on Equilibrium Strategies in Efficient Auction Designs
In what follows, we want to understand equilibrium strategies in CAs with allocation constraints.
In order to analyze such CAs with respect to efficiency and incentive compatibility we first need to understand the impact of allocation constraints on those CA formats, which are known to be efficient with a strong game-theoretical solution concept. First, we analyze the VCG auction, which is known to be the unique CA format that is strategy proof, efficient and individually rational (Green and Laffont 1977) . Second, we focus on ascending CAs as iBundle, the APA, and dVSV in which straightforward bidding is an ex post equilibrium for buyer submodular valuations.
The analysis integrates the auction mechanisms in Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) in this gametheoretical framework and provides conditions, when this auction format leads to an ex post Nash equilibrium.
Definition 7. A strategy profile s * = (s * 1 , ..., s * n ) is an ex-post Nash equilibrium iff the utility functions u i satisfy
In other words, truthful bidding in every round of an auction is an ex-post (Nash) equilibrium, if for every bidder i ∈ I, if all other bidders follow the truthful bidding strategy, then bidder i maximizes his payoff in the auction by following the truthful bidding strategy independent of the type t of other bidders (Mishra and Parkes 2007) . Ex post equilibria avoid speculation about other bidders' valuations or types and could therefore reduce the strategic complexity for bidders considerably, leading to higher efficiency, and also an increased adoption of ascending CAs. Note that this is weaker than a dominant strategy equilibrium, where bidders do not have to speculate about other bidders' valuations and strategies. In contrast to dominant strategy and ex post equilibria, Bayes-Nash equilibria do always exist, but they require bidders to speculate on both, the type and the strategy of others. We refer to dominant and ex post equilibria as strong solution concepts. For Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS ascending auctions we focus on ex post equilibria, as preference elicitation in an indirect mechanism typically does not allow for dominant strategy equilibria (Conitzer and Sandholm 2002).
Let us first introduce two definitions to describe bidder valuations, before we discuss individual auction formats.
Definition 8. A coalitional value function V maps a set of bidders J to a real number V (J), equal to the total value created from trade among these bidders and the auctioneer.
CAP implements a coalitional value function in the context of CAs. Bidder submodularity describes a property of the coalitional value function, which allows for strong solution concepts in ascending CAs and core outcomes in the VCG auction, as we will see below. 
Since allocation constraints may alter (lower) V (J), imposing them may turn a coalitional value function from not BSM to BSM or vice versa 11 . The simplest example to see this, is to impose the allocation constraint "max one winner". Any function will then turn into BSM. The constraint "min three winners" turns any function into not BSM. In the following, when we refer to V (J) or BSM, these are computed by taking into account present allocation constraints.
The VCG Mechanism
The VCG outcome serves as a baseline for all other efficient auction formats. For example, under BSM valuations APA, iBundle, and dVSV terminate with VCG prices which are in the core, eliminating incentives for speculation. Core prices have the property that no coalition of bidders can renegotiate the outcome with the auctioneer in order to increase everyones payoff in this coalition.
The VCG auction is a sealed bid auction allowing for package bids on all combinations of items.
Bidders place sealed XOR bids on their desired packages without getting any feedback by the auctioneer or knowing bids of other bidders. The auctioneer calculates a feasible allocation X * that maximizes the sum of bid prices. Bidders payments are calculated in a second step. Winning bidders pay their bid prices b i (S) reduced by a discount which is equal to their marginal contribution to the whole economy.
) ∀S ∈ X * and zero otherwise.
We concentrate on allocation constraints in this paper. While Ausubel and Milgrom (2006b) show that budget constraints can lead to inefficiency in the VCG mechanism, allocation constraints do not affect its properties. However, the calculation of the VCG prices and in particular of the 11 Also the implication by Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) (Goods Are Subtitutes) ⇒ BSM does not hold in the presence of allocation constraints.
coalitional value from V (J) with J ⊂ I has to consider the allocation constraints, as otherwise the auctioneer could suffer a negative payoff and participation would not be individually rational.
Definition 10. (Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009) ) An environment exhibits the no-singleagent effect if ∀i, ∀v −i , ∀X there exists an allocation X that is feasible without i and
A mechanism is weakly budget balanced when it will not lose money, this means if the mechanism is not weakly budget balanced the auctioneer might be confronted with a negative payoff which would contradict individual rationality of the mechanism. If the no-single-agent effect does not hold, the auctioneer might want to consider bids by bidders i / ∈ J to assure a feasible allocation, while maximizing V (J).
Efficient Ascending CAs
The recent game-theoretical research has led to a coherent theoretical framework and a family of ascending CAs (iBundle, APA, dVSV) which satisfy an ex post equilibrium under BSM. These efficient ascending CAs use personalized and non-linear prices. They calculate a provisional value maximizing allocation at the end of every round and increase the prices for a certain group of bidders. The different approaches can be interpreted as implementations of primal-dual algorithms (dVSV) or subgradient algorithms (iBundle, APA) to solve an underlying linear programming problem (de Vries et al. 2007 ). This linear program (CAP 3 ) always yields integral solutions and the dual variables have a natural interpretation as non-linear and personalized ask prices (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002) .
We want to understand, whether additional allocation constraints have an impact on equilibrium strategies and efficiency in these auction formats.
For this reason, we analyze the impact of allocation constraints on CAP 3 . The original CAP 3 formulation changes with additional allocation
constraints. An arbitrary allocation constraint can make certain allocations infeasible. Rather than modeling specific allocation constraints, we keep our analysis general and partition the set of all allocations in two subsets: the feasible allocations C and the infeasible ones C u , which turn infeasible due to the violation of certain allocation constraints (e.g. the maximum number of winners).
This extends CAP 3 by constraint set (LP4):
The dual to the extended CAP 3 in (5) is:
The decision variables of the primal are: x i (S) denoting whether bidder i wins package S and y(X) denoting whether allocation X is realized or not. In the dual, π s and π i denote the auctioneers' and bidder i's profit respectively whereas p i (S) denotes the ask price for the package S and bidder i.
Prices are summarized by p. Theorem 3.1 in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) shows that allocation X and prices p form a competitive equilibrium (CE), if X is an optimal solution to the primal CAP 3 and (p, π i , π S ), where π i , π S are payoffs resulting from X and prices p are an optimal solution to the corresponding dual linear program. Their proof is based on the resulting complementary slackness conditions. We show that additional allocation constraints causing additional infeasible solutions do not impact the theorem and the equivalence between competitive equilibrium and optimal solution to (5) is still given. Let us first enumerate the complementary slackness (CS)
conditions:
The competitive equilibrium (CE) conditions are:
Lemma 2. (X * , p * ) is a CE if and only if the integral solution dictated by X * is an optimal solution to primal CAP 3 (5) and (p * , π * i , π * S ) is an optimal solution to dual CAP 3 (6).
Proof: We follow the proof of Theorem 3.1 by Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) , and show that the additional infeasible allocations due to additional allocation constraints do not violate the equivalence of competitive equilibrium and optimality of the winner determination problem. The due to the allocation constraints additional (CS4) and (CS7) do always hold, as y(X) = 0 for the infeasible allocations (cf. (LP4) and y(X) ≥ 0). Denote with S * i the package bidder i is assigned under allocation X * .
Sufficiency: Suppose the LP (5) has an integral solution X * with x i (S) = 1 iff S = S * i and
because it does not appear anywhere else than in (DLP2b) and the program minimizes π s . (CS5) and (DLP1) imply the first CE condition (CE1). (DLP2a) and (DLP2b) imply
Due to t(X * ) ≥ S i ∈X p i (S) the last term is always smaller or equal to zero, while the first term is always greater or equal to zero. Due to (CS6) the above inequality implies the second CE condition (CE2). Hence (X * , p * ) is a CE.
Necessity: Let (X * , p * ) be a CE. Therefore by definition:
Let x i (S) = 1 iff S = S * i and y(X) = 1 iff X = X * , else 0. X * is a feasible solution to LP (5) since the allocation is supported in a CE equilibrium. Similarly (π * s , π * i , p * , t(X * )) is feasible to DLP (6). The dual variable t(X) does not impact this equivalence. The remaining proof showing that the integral solution we just constructed is optimal, is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) . Q.E.D.
Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS Definition 11. A straightforward bidder bids only for those packages that maximize his payoff given the current ask prices.
Corollary 2. The CAP 3 formulation with allocation constraints (5) yields integral solutions and thus the efficient ascending CAs (iBundle, APA, dVSV) terminate at a CE even if allocation constraints are present and bidders follow the straightforward bidding strategy.
This follows directly from Lemma 2 and the original proofs of the efficiency of iBundle (Parkes and Ungar 2000) and dVSV (de Vries et al. 2007 ). Parkes and Ungar (2000) show that all complementary slackness conditions except (CS1) are satisfied in each round of the iBundle auction.
(CS1) states that every bidder with a positive utility for some packages at the current prices must receive a package in the allocation. Only in the last round this condition is satisfied for all bidders.
The new complementary slackness conditions (CS4) and (CS7) due to allocation constraints are trivially satisfied, because y(X) is null, and do not impact the proof. While the price updates in dVSV follow a primal-dual algorithm, iBundle and APA can be considered subgradient algorithms (de Vries et al. 2007 ). Ausubel and Milgrom (2006a) show that the APA (and therefore iBundle) terminates with an efficient solution and straightforward bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium strategy when the BSM condition holds. The proof is defined on some coalitional value function, which might be implemented by CAP 3 but also a CAP 3 with additional allocation constraints, and it is therefore not affected by allocation constraints. In summary, allocation constraints neither have an impact on the efficiency of the family of efficient ascending CAs, nor on the incentive properties. While iBundle, the APA, and dVSV allow for allocation constraints, they do not explicitly take them into account in the pricing rule, but implement simple price increments for subsets of bidders.
Efficiency and Equilibrium Analysis of FCAs
In what follows, we want to understand economical characteristics of FCAs and whether pricing rules such as W L, and DL can also achieve 100% efficiency with a strong solution concept, and how they relate to other efficient ascending CAs such as iBundle, APA, and dVSV introduced earlier. Except from the ask price calculation (i.e., pricing rules) the following auctions (FCA W L and FCA DL ) are equivalent to APA and iBundle. As in all other efficient ascending CAs we will first assume a straightforward bidding strategy where the bidders only have to reveal their demand set in each round. We will show that while FCA W L does not even lead to an efficient solution with this bidding strategy, FCA DL leads to an efficient outcome and straightforward bidding is an ex-post equilibrium with buyer submodular valuations. Throughout we will assume an XOR bidding language.
FCA W L
In the FCA W L auction losing bidders in a round get an ask price of W L(S, i) + for a package S.
In each round W Ls for losing bids of losing bidders have to be calculated. This causes the FCA W L to be an ascending CA, although generally, W Ls are not monotonically increasing as DLs are (cf.
Section 3, Proposition 2).
Proposition 5. FCA W L is an ascending CA.
Proof: It is more convenient to speak of auction rounds r than of states here. W L r (S, i) is only updated right after the submission of a bid (S, v, r − 1, i) and therefore W L r (S, i) can never be lower than the bid's value v. But v is equal to the W L r (S, i) presented to the bidder before the submission, hence for any r < r it holds W L r (S, i) ≤ W L r (S, i) (the round r is either the previous round the bidder had bid on S or the first round). Q.E.D.
The efficiency of a FCA W L can be as low as 0% if the bidders bid straightforward and valuations are demand masking. We set mV s > V b > V s so that at the efficient allocation every bidder wins a single item. Table 5 Demand masking set of bidder valuations
Let m = |K| be the number of items. We will first provide an example with m = 4, V s = $2 and
Example 3. There are four bidders, B1 to B4 and four items A to D. Table 6 indicates the auction progress. Prices are initialized to $0. At the beginning, all bidders bid on the big package.
When its price increases to $3, then the losing bidders bid also on the single items, since their payoff is $2, i.e. equals the payoff of the big package. Their bids on the single items are unsuccessful and the prices are updated to $4. These updated prices exceed their valuations V s = $2, therefore they never bid again on the single items and the auction fails to reach the efficient solution. Table 6 FCAW L process
Proof: We distinguish two cases:
If inequality (7) holds, FCA W L is inefficient. At the beginning, all bidders bid on the big package K.
They do so until the round r at which its winning level exceeds V b −V s and thus its payoff falls below the payoff of a single item. Denote with w the winner of the big package at this round. All other bidders lose. Their payoffs are higher for the single items than the big package and therefore they bid on them at the current price 0 (payoff
whereby δ denotes a small constant). These bids of zero value are unsuccessful and the single item prices (i.e. winning levels) for the next round amount to the winning bid of w which was
since V b > V s . Thus they bid again on the big package. Furthermore, due to (7) their payoffs for the single items (equal to 2V s − V b ) are negative and they will never bid on them again. The auction ends by assigning the big package to an arbitrary bidder. The efficiency is V b /(mV s ) and for
Thus for a large m, it converges to 0%. On the contrary, if (7) does not hold, the bidders will bid again on the small items at price V b − V s when the payoff of the big package falls below payoff(item l) = 2V s − V b . They win the single items and the auction ends with the efficient outcome. Note also that for m = 2 the reverse inequality (7) cannot be satisfied due to requirement mV s > V b and hence the auction is efficient for m = 2 and inefficient for m > 2.
Q.E.D.
While there might also be other bidder valuations leading to low efficiency, it is sufficient for our purposes to show that the efficiency of FCA W L can actually be as low.
FCA DL
Contrary to the negative results on FCA W L , we show that FCA DL leads to full efficiency with straightforward bidding, but it requires less rounds and less bids than iBundle and the APA.
The only difference between FCA DL and FCA W L is that in FCA DL , ask prices are updated to DL(S, i) + .
Lemma 3. DL ask prices are always higher or equal to iBundle prices given the same bids.
Proof: Let p k i (S) be the iBundle price after k bids are submitted. iBundle uses an XOR bidding language, and let CAP k (S, i) denote the highest bid of i in S (bids of one bidder cannot be combined due to XOR): CAP k (S, i) = max{v|(T, v, k , i), T ⊆ S, k ≤ k}. Equation (4) 12 . Thus
To prove the efficiency of FCA DL , we draw on the proof of optimality by Parkes and Ungar (2000) and show that optimality is not affected by the requirement to bid DLs + instead of only an above the last losing bid. Their proof works on a primal and a dual version of CAP , due to Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) . This version is known as CAP 2 and is very similar to CAP 3 . The main difference is that its prices are anonymous and it corresponds to the auction iBundle(2). To prove the efficiency of iBundle (2), it is assumed that no single bidder bids on Proof: The only modification of FCA DL , i.e. to quote DLs instead of simple price updates, only affects the proof with respect to the complementary slackness condition CS-6. We only need to show that CS-6, which states that "the allocation must maximize the auctioneer's profit at prices p(S), over all possible allocations and irrespective of bids received by agents", is satisfied by FCA DL too. Replace p(S) by DL(S). From the DL computation follows that there is always a bidder or group of bidders willing to pay DL(S) for every package in the value-maximizing allocation X * DL that is computed based on the prices (DLs) and irrespective of the bids. For this, observe that the highest possible DL(S), which is the case when no bids are blockable, is equal to CAP (S) considering all submitted bids. Hence there is always a bidder or a group of bidders willing to pay DL(S). Therefore, allocation X * DL with auctioneer's profit S * ∈X * DL DL(S * ) can 12 Due to the free disposal assumption implying that packages are priced at least as high as the greatest price of any package they contain, i.e.
Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 0000 INFORMS be realized by assigning each S * to a subset of bidders J(S * ), J(S * ) ⊆ I with J(S * ) = ∅. Every bidder receives at most one package and hence the XOR constraint is not violated. The reason is that packages S * form a feasible allocation and are obviously non-overlapping and no single bidder bids on non-overlapping packages due to the bid safety condition. In summary, we showed that it is always possible for the auctioneer to realize the profit-maximizing allocation at prices DL(S)
irrespective of bids received, since the computation of DLs ensures there are always bidders willing to take these prices 13 . Q.E.D.
Theorem 4. FCA DL is efficient if bidders follow the straightforward bidding strategy. This strategy is an ex-post Nash equilibrium if the BSM condition holds.
Theorem 4 follows directly from Lemma 4 and Ausubel and Milgrom (2006a) .
FCA DL can reduce the number of auction rounds, which is a considerable problem of iBundle as shown by Scheffel et al. (2011) and Schneider et al. (2010) . The reason is that dead bids in iBundle, which will never be part of the winning allocation, are skipped and prices increase faster.
We provide a simple example that FCA DL can terminate with strictly less rounds than iBundle.
Example 4. Consider items A,B,C are auctioned among bidders B1 to B4 in iBundle and FCA DL using an increment of = 1. Bidders bid straightforward and are single minded which means they value only one package positively and all others with zero. The exact valuations of each bidder and the auction rounds are described in Table 7 . Ties are broken in favor of more winners. Table 7 iBundle and FCADL process
The example illustrated in Table 7 shows that FCA DL reduces the number of auction rounds, the communication effort (since dead bids are not submitted) and also the computational effort.
In general the reduction of auction rounds and communication effort comes at the price of higher computational effort as the Π Surprisingly, in a realistic value model with regional and global bidders, which resembls the setting of FCC sprectum auctions, F CA DL can substantially decrease the number of rounds and communication effort. In more generic V M 2, which is the case when many bidders have homogeneous valuations, RRR → 50% and CRR → 50% for m = 2.
Numerical Experiments
The computational complexity results for exact DLs suggest that the computational costs outweigh the benefits. We supplement the theoretical analysis with an experimental comparison of FCA DL and iBundle. Since there are hardly any real-world CA data sets available, we have adopted value models of the Combinatorial Auctions Test Suite (CATS) (Leyton-Brown et al. 2000) . In addition to CATS value models, we have used an extended version of the Pairwise Synergy value model from An et al. (2005) . A more detailed description of the value models is provided in Appendix C, while the computation of DLs is described in Appendix B. For each value model we created 30 auction instances with different valuations, and ran each of them with both auction formats. All auctions used a bid increment of 1. Table 8 Comparison of F CADL to iBundle. Left part for small size and right part for medium size auctions. In small size auctions (see Table 8 ) we observe a considerable reduction of the auction rounds across all value models and particularly in Pairwise Synergy+, where the maximum over the 30 auctions (RRR max ) is 47.945%. This is due to the existence of two bidder segments, regional and global, which leads to high RRR. The average CRR is over 30% in all value models except the Transportation value model, where bidders are only interested in a very limited set of packages. RF is the ratio of total run time of FCA DL to iBundle. Surprisingly, despite of the high computational complexity of DLs, the run times of FCA DL is sometimes even lower than that of iBundle (see 8 where RF < 1). The reason is the lower number of bids submitted, which shortens the winner determination in each round. The average computation time of a DL, denoted as P CT , ranges from 1.0 to 3.4 milliseconds only.
The mid-sized auctions with up to 9 items led to higher computation times than iBundle since many more DLs had to be computed. Also in these experiments computing a DL took between 1ms and 170ms only. The communication between auctioneer and bidders (CRR) was reduced substantially in all value models, but the total runtime RF increased.
We conducted additional experiments with 10 items and 9 bidders in different value models, where bidders submit bids on every possible package. Also in these larger instances, the computation lasted only 1.48s on average. Obviously, the computation time depends on many parameters such as the package size, the size of the complementary subauction, the number of bidders and their bids. However, our results indicate that computing DLs in ascending auctions might well be used in practical applications.
Conclusion
Designing efficient combinatorial auctions turned out to be a challenging task. A few recent papers have described efficient and ascending combinatorial auctions which satisfy strong game-theoretical solution concepts. In many applications the consideration of additional allocation constraints and flexibility in the choice of the bidding language are essential. These requirements have not been considered in the design of price feedback in the theoretical literature so far. It is important to extend the theory respectively. This could increase the applicability of ascending combinatorial auctions in domains such as transportation or industrial procurement considerably and bare significant practical potential.
We consider ascending combinatorial auctions allowing for side constraints and OR as well as XOR bidding languages. We draw on the work by Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) and define winning and deadness levels (W Ls and DLs) as a general pricing rule for ascending combinatorial auctions, which allow for different bidding languages and allocation constraints. This extension leads to a number of theoretical challenges. We show that straightforward bidding is an ex post equilibrium in ascending combinatorial auctions with DLs, and how this pricing rule can be integrated in the theoretical framework of efficient and ascending combinatorial auctions.
While both, iBundle and the FCA DL allow for allocation constraints, DLs take allocation constraints into account and actually lead to a lower number of auction rounds and bids that need to be submitted. The high number of auction rounds turned out to be one of the main obstacles for efficient ascending combinatorial auctions such as iBundle, the Ascending Proxy Auction, and dVSV. DLs come at a computational cost, however. The computation is a Π P 2 -complete problem. We show, however, that such ask prices can be calculated for up to 10 items and 9 bidders with realistic value models in less than 1.5 seconds in experiments, which suggests that these approaches might well be used in applications. Approximations to the exact computation of DLs could potentially be an area of future research. In words, the DL is the minimal price to win the item in a possible future auction state. The W L is the minimal price to win it at the next state, thus it cannot be lower. c)(K, v, k +1, i) ∈ W IN k+1 (K) ⇒ v ≥ CAP k (K). Thus the minimum v, i.e. the W L, is W L k (K) = CAP k (K).
In words, to win in the next auction state all auctioned items, a bidder must bid at least the current auction value. Every lower bid will not be winning in any future auction state since the auction value will not sink. Q.E.D. V M 2: Every bidder bids on the same package. Let p r denote its highest price over all bidders at round r.
In F CA DL p r increases by after each round. In iBundle it can be easily seen that in every m consecutive rounds, there is one round where p r remains unchanged since all losing bidders just level the price of the previously winning bid, thus on average the price increase is (1 − . Regarding CRR, in iBundle each bidder submit p f inal + 1 bids. In F CA DL , w.l.o.g. we assume that all but two bidders always lose (tie breaking). These two bidders alternately increase their bids by 2 and the computational effort for these two is equal to the effort for one of the always losing bidders. Thus CRR = 
